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Introduction 
I. An Overview of the Japanese M&A Market 
Mergers and acquisitions are relatively new phenomena in the Japanese market. The 
total number ofM&A transactions per year has increased from approximately 500 to 
1,752 between 1995 and 2002 (Figure 1 and Figure 2, page 32)1. MergerStat records 
3,510 and 7,411 transactions in the U.S. for the equivalent years2 • The percentage of 
M&A transactions per number of business entities was 0.03% for Japan in 2001 and 0.1 % 
for the U.S. in 20023 • As illustrated through the figures, the frequency ofM&A in Japan 
is considerably lower relative to the U.S., but proliferation of transactions is evident as 
well. 
Post-merger performances of firms in the progressing Japanese M&A market is an 
interesting subject to examine. Measuring the short-run performances of the firms should 
give insights for future transactions. Further, a comparison of the results with the U.S. 
M&A market may suggest how the Japanese M&A is likely to grow. 
II. The U.S. M&A Market in the 1980s 
The climate of the present Japanese M&A market correlates to that of the U.S in 
the 1980s when a large merger wave hit the U.S. economy. The relaxation of restrictions 
on mergers imposed by the antitrust laws, withdrawal of resources from shrinking 
industries, deregulation in the financial service, oil, gas, transportation, and broadcasting 
1 "Japan in Figures 2005," 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/dataifigures/zuhyou/1626.xls 
2 "Mergerstat," 
http://www.mergerstat.com/new/free reports In and a activity.asp 
3 This percentage is calculated by dividing the number of M&A transactions by the nUlnberof 
business entities recorded in the country for Japan and U.S. respectively. Sources used are Reeof, 
Japan in Figures, Mergerstat, and the U.S. Census Bureau (http://censtats.censlls.gov/cgi-
bin/cbpnaic/cbpsel.p\). 
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markets, and improvements in takeover technology, including a larger supply of 
increasingly sophisticated legal and financial advisers, improvements in financing 
technology such as strip financing were factors that contributed to major restructuring of 
corporate assets (Jensen, 1988). 
III. Forms of M&A in Japan 
The term "M&A", an abbreviation for "mergers and acquisitions" is commonly 
used in the U.S. and Japan. Its definition and use of term, however, are distinct. M&A in 
the U.S. refers simply to transactions of mergers and acquisitions. Defined broadly, a 
merger is the joining of two firms into a single firm. Acquisition is the acquiring by one 
firm of a controlling interest in another. The distinction between mergers and 
acquisitions lie in control. In a merger, the stockholders or owners of both pre-merger 
companies have a share in the ownership of the merged business, whereas in an 
acquisition, it is the takeover of the ownership and management control of one company 
by another. 
As described in a recent article in Yomiuri Newspaper4 , "M&A" is a broad term 
in Japan and it encompasses above and beyond the two types of transactions abbreviated 
in the term. General consensus from research databanks such as Recof and Nomura 
Securities, and Bank of Japan show the categorization method below. 
Categorization of Japanese M&A consists of five groups 5 • 
~ Merger: Combining of more than two firms into one business entity. 
~ Acquisition: Stock purchase exceeding 50% of the shares of the target by the 
acqUIrer. 
4 "Understanding M&A from the Basics," Yomiuri Newspaper, March 1,2005. 
5 Definition extracted from Recof: 
http ://msh.recof.co.jp/english/ma.html 
4 
~ Business Transfer: Purchase of operating assets of the target by the acquirer or 
business integration of acquirer and target. . 
~ Minority Interest: Stock purchase of less than 50% of the shares of the target by the 
acquirer. 
~ Increased Interest: The acquirer purchases additional shares in the target, but not 
more than 50 percent of the target's total shares. 
The two types of M&A studied in this paper are mergers and business transfers. 
IV. Business Transfer 
Business transfer is one form of M&A frequent in Japan. It is the partial sale of a 
firm. Firms engage in the transaction by selling or buying businesses within a firm, 
where "business" is defined to be a systematically organized group within a firm for 
operational purposes, consisting of both tangible and intangible assets. ;For instance, 
simply transferring the equipment and machinery of a factory is not considered a business 
transfer. For the transaction to be categorized into this group, it requires the transfer of 
employees, patent rights, brands, client list, along with tangible assets. The figure below 
illustrates the transaction. 
FirmA Cash FirmB 
C 1 
1 C I ,.. 
Transfer of Business 
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There are several laws pertaining to business transfers in Japan. 
Commercial Law 260, 231, 232: 
A transfer of business requires the consent of Board of Directors. 
Securities Exchange Act 166: 
For insider stock trading, or any individual involved in the firms undergoing a transfer of 
business through employment, stocks may not be bought or sold on the basis of 
information obtained through employment, until the transfer of operation is publicly 
announced. 
Anti-monopoly Act 16: 
Prior to January 1, 1999, all business transfers required filing with the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission, but Amendment has relaxed requiements. Filing requirement applies only 
under certain circumstances. For instance, transactions consisting of total assets of one 
billion yen (approximately $9.5 billion) must be reported to the Japan Trade Commission. 
V. Characteristics of the Current Japanese M&A Market 
Four characteristics are notable in the current Japanese M&A market. First, 
overwhelming evidence indicates that the majority ofM&A activity is on the "buy side". 
Firms are proactive in buying firms or initiating negotiations but reluctant when it comes 
to accepting a merger offer or becoming an acquisition target. 
One reason for the lethargic "sell side" lies in the Japanese concept of 
corporations, specifically, the concept of firms held by managers. Instead of utilizing 
M&A as a means to carry out strategic restructuring, Japanese managers have historically 
perceived it as a last resort to bankruptcy. This is illustrated through a 1990 survey 
conducted by Nikkei Financial Newspaper (Figure 3 and Figure 4, page 33). A whopping 
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65.8% of managers deemed M&A necessary in their business either presently or 
sometime in the future. However, when asked how they would respond to an offer to 
become a transaction target, 72.4% would reject the offer under any condition. This 
shows an imbalance of supply and demand of M&A and a scarcity of firms accepting a 
M&A negotiation offer (Economic Planning Agency Research Bureau Council of 
Investment Promotion). This may also explain why the Japanese M&A market is often 
perceived as an extremely difficult arena to enter for foreign firms seeking a transaction, 
despite the absence of laws that directly prevent M&A activity. 
Second, transactions that involve only a portion of a firm have greatly increased. 
This is also known as "partial M&A". Business transfers, minority interest, and 
increased interests exceed the rate of increase in transactions compared to that of mergers 
and acquisitions. As a business strategy, more firms are separating their core business 
from non-core business today. This allows a firm to concentrate on its strengths while 
removing their weaknesses. 
Third, due to the recent economic slump, bank's writing-off of bad debts has led 
successive bankruptcies of public companies. As a result M&A are means to rehabilitate 
failed companies. 
Lastly, the number of cross-border transactions has increased. Figure 5 (page 34) 
shows that until 1996, foreign companies initiating transactions to Japanese companies 
averaged 10-13 transactions annually but thereafter surged to over 100 transactions per 
year. Moreover, there has been a sharp rise in transactions where Japanese companies 
initiate negotiations with U.S. firms. 
The recent intensity of M&A activity can be attributed to financial deregulation, 
the prolonged economic slump, and relaxation in laws pertinent to M&A activity. 
First and foremost, fmancial deregulation has had a significant effect on increased 
M&A activity. Deregulation started in the early 1970s and took some 25 years for the 
process to be completed. In 1996, the series of deregulation was officially announced as 
the "Big Bang" by the Japanese government. New options became available for firms to 
borrow along with banks. Two changes in the Japanese Financial System give firms 
. more options to finance their investments or restructure its form of business in ways such 
asM&A. 
1. Bond issuance rules were eased, and the number of companies that could 
issue unsecured bonds went up. 
2. In the late 1970s, interest rates in the call market, tegata market, and the 
gensaki market were all freed from any regulation. In the late 1980s, all 
other rates except deposit rates were fully liberalized. 
After the bubble burst in 1991, the Japanese economy experienced a prolonged 
economic slowdown, and firms were subsequently compelled to re-examine their 
management strategy. In the late 1990s, when land prices and stock prices persistently 
depreciated, many firms realized the necessity of making radical changes to the premises 
of their businesses. Firms used various forms ofM&A as a way to expand their business 
and potentially create profits under sluggish sales (Ozeki et aI., 2003). 
There were a number of changes in legislations, the tax system, and the 
accounting system that affect the procedure for M&A. The changes enabled firms to 
explore different possibilities in the form of M&A, and the simplification in the 
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procedure has encouraged more firms to undertake M&A transactions. Table 1 (page 41) 
highlights some changes that took place in the M&A procedure. 
The Fair Trade Commission has relaxed their attitude towards M&A as well. 
Formerly, the Fair Trade Commission examined market share ofpost-M&A firms on a 
per product basis. The Commission today takes into account the effects of contiguous 
industries when examining merger cases. Transactions with post-transaction market 
share exceeding 25% were given strict scrutiny in the past. However, we see numerous 
transactions today that exceed 25% of the market share that do not trigger inquires from 
the Commission. Mitsui Petroleum Industrial merging with Mitsui Touatsu and Pacific 
Cement with Japan Cement represent two transactions that have taken place within the 
last ten years that resulted in a post-market share of25%. Nevertheless, they were 
granted permission smoothly without scrutiny by the Fair Trade Commission. 
VL Research Objective 
The goal of this research is to determine whether short-run post-merger effects 
following a transaction exist in the recent Japanese M&A market. 60 public 
manufacturing firms, consisting of merger and business transfer cases in 1995-1999 will 
be assessed through return on assets and return on equity. Periods examined for pre-
merger and post-merger are 1990-1994 and 2000-2004 respectively. The "merger effect" 
will be examined upon controlling for the pre-merger effect on post-merger effect, the 
type of transaction, and the frequency of transactions in the time period being examined. 
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Relevant Literature 
Several studies in the U.S. on post-merger profitability of firms are relevant to 
this paper. Ravenscraft et ai. (1987) examined the target firm profitability for 471 firms 
that merged between 1950 and 1976. They studied operating income and cash flow 
between the periods of 1971 to 1977. Their results suggested that target firms suffered 
profitability losses after the merger. However, mergers of equal-sized firms out-
performed the control group. Since the post-merger period that is examined is not 
aligned with the period in which firms merged, the results do not have direct implications 
for a rise or decline in profitability as a result of a transaction. In addition, the post-
merger profitability is only studied for acquiring firms, thus acquired firms performance 
is ignored. This leaves room to study the whole merger effect. 
Healy et al. (1992) examined post-merger operating performance for the 50 
largest U.S. industrial firms between 1979 and 1984. Contrary to the results of 
Ravenscraft et aI., merged firms experienced significant improvements in asset 
productivity, leading to higher operating cash flows relative to their industry. Further, 
they found that the short-run improvements were not gained at the expense oflong-term 
...... 
performance, since sample firms maintained their capital expenditure and R&D rates 
relative to their industries after the merger. 
Andrade et al. (2001) found similar results in their study. Their sample consisted 
of 2,000 mergers from 1973 to 1998 for which accounting data were available. They 
measured operating performance as the sales-weighted average of the acquirer and target 
abnormal operating performance measures. Their findings indicated that the combined 
target and acquirer operating performance was already strong compared to the industry 
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prior to the merger, and improved slightly after the merger acquisition when compared to 
industry averages. 
Auerbach et al. (1985) examined the effects of tax benefits on M&A through 318 
mergers and acquisitions that took place over the period 1968-1983. A substantial 
number of the firms from the dataset entered transactions with some constraint on their 
ability to use tax benefits. Specifically, a fifth of the dataset consisted of cases where one 
firm faced tax constraints such as the presence of tax credits or losses carried forward, 
while the other firm had positive current federal taxes and no other constraints. The 
authors found that tax benefits could have played a significant role only for a small 
fraction of the transactions. Further, examining the ratio of combined debt to equity 
value for the parent and target firms in the sample, they concluded that the ratio increased 
only a slight 2.1 percentage points. This value is almost negligible, given the magnitude 
of year-to-year changes in aggregate debt-to-value ratios over the sample period 
(Auerbach et al., 310). 
Theories and Hypotheses 
Economic theories and hypotheses predict motivations for firms engaged in M&A 
activities. Firms seek higher market power, productivity, and efficiency following M&A 
transactions. Based upon economic theory, improvement in profitability of firms in the 
post-merger period is expected. 
I. Increasing Market Power 
Other things equal, transactions within an industry increase the market share of 
the combined firms. The concentration of firms in a market is an important element of 
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market structure and a determinant of competition. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or 
the Herfmdahl index is a statistical measure of concentration used by the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Reserve in analyzing the competitive effects of mergers in the 
u.s. 
The index is calculated as follows. 
n 
HH1 = L MS2 
i :::: 1 
The index accounts for the relative size of all firms in the market by taking into 
account the number of firms in a market, n, as well as concentration (Rhodes, 2001). 
It gives heavier weight to firms with large market shares, MS, than to firms with small 
shares since the market share is squared. With higher concentration, firms are capable of 
obtaining larger market share, which predicts improvement in profitability after a merger 
transaction. 
IL Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale are present when the average cost of the product decreases as 
the volume of output increases. Applying this concept to mergers, higher production 
level in the post-merger period resulting from combined assets will allow specialization 
among firms and workers, leading to a higher profit level. Anticipation of economies of 
scale may be one motivation for firms to seek merger transactions. 
III. Economies of Scope 
Economies of scope may be another motivation for mergers. Analogous to 
economies of scale, but slightly differentiated, economies of scope refers to efficiency 
gained through the expansion of scope, or the number of different output types, rather 
than from an increase in the volume of total output. Sharing equipment, for instance, 
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allows for aggregated fixed costs to decrease while introducing diversification in product 
lines (Given, 1996). 
IV. Market-for-Corporate-Control 
The market for corporate control refers to the market for the right to control the 
management of corporate resources. According to the market-for-corporate control 
hypothesis, a firm is capable of capturing potential gains from a merger through increased 
efficiency. The hypothesis is based on manager and shareholder relationships. In most 
firms, shareholders delegate the responsibility of managing the firm to professional 
managers. The pressure put on managers to perform well and act on behalf of 
shareholders generally increase the wealth of the firm. However, this is not true in some 
cases where managers have difficulty abandoning the strategies that have required much 
time and effort. Regardless of their inefficiency, some managers often preserve these 
strategies. "Such changes can require abandonment of major projects, relocation of 
facilities, changes in managerial assignments, and closure or sale of facilities or divisions 
(Jensen, 1988)". 
With mergers and acquisitions, new management can solve this problem. The 
management of the firm is re-considered and sometimes changes hands. The process 
works so that the bidder negotiates an agreement with the target management on the 





Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are two profitability ratios 
which analyze a firm's performance. The ratios measure the overall efficiency of the 
firm in managing its total investment in assets and in generating return to shareholders 
respectively. Return on assets describes the amount of profit earned relative to the level 
of investment in total assets. Return on equity measures the return to common . 
shareholders. Benchmarks for the profitability ratios will be the pre-merger ratios of the 
company itself. 
• ROA=EBIT/Total Assets 
Return on assets indicates the amount of profit a firm earned relative to the level of 
investment in total assets (Fraser et aI., 176). It is calculated by taking the firm's 
earnings before interest and taxes are deducted (EBIT) and dividing it by total assets. 
• ROE=Net Income/Stockholder's Equity 
Return on equity is a measurement of the return to common shareholders and is 
calculated by taking the net income of the firm and dividing it by the stockholder's 
equity. 
Gains and losses following a transaction may change according to whose position or 
perspective is taken: shareholders, creditors, or some other group of stakeholders (Bodie 
et aI., 2002). ROA takes the standpoint ofa firm by assessing the efficiency of the firm 
in generating profits with respect to assets. On the other hand, ROE takes the standpoint 
of shareholders by focusing on returns to equity. This standpoint is what differentiates 
the use of net income and EBIT. Because payments to shareholders are completed after 
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the fIrm pays for taxes and interests, net income is the value of income (also regarded as 
EBIT), after deducting taxes and interests. 
IL Flow Diagrams 
Since analysis involves two types of M&A transactions in this paper, the method in 
constructing the pre- and post-merger ROA and ROE is discussed in this section. Below 
is an illustration of three ways of measurement. Establishing the standpoint will allow 
one to consider spurious results associated with each case. The fIrst case illustrated is 
applied in this paper to measure profItability of mergers and business transfer 
transactions. The highlighted area in each diagram shows the aggregated values to 
construct the ROA or ROE ratio. 
Merger 
The simplest form of measurement is a merger transaction. The pre-merger ROA or 
ROE is the aggregated ratio for the two fIrms. The post-merger is the ratio for the 
resulting fIrm after combining the two fIrms. 
+ A B Pre-Merger 
A+B Post-Merger 
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Transfer of Operations: Casel 
The method of measurement for business transfers are more complicated since there is no 
perfect measure. Ideally, if the ROA or ROE ratio for Ba was known in the pre-merger 
stage, a comparison of A+Ba from the post-merger to A+Ba to the pre-merger would 
capture the true merger effect. This is not possible since accounting data for Ba is 
unobtainable. Thus, we consider three alternative ways to calculate performance 
measurements and discuss how they may differ under certain scenarios. 
The first case follows the same format as the method for mergers. The pre-merger 
measure is an aggregated ratio of the two complete firms. Profitability measure is 
computed for the two aggregated firms for the post-merger as well. The flaw in this 
method of measurement is that the post-merger Bb accounts for other business sectors 
within the firm that i1) not really part of the merger transaction. A poor performance of 
post-merger Bb may be attributed to a sector or a project that was never involved in the 
business transaction. 





A+Ba + Bb Post-Merger 
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Transfer of Operations: Case2 
This method is useful in examining the post-merger effect from the perspective offirm 
A's shareholders. The pre-merger profitability ratio is constructed solely from firm A's 
accounting data. This is compared to the aggregated values of firm A and B in the post-
merger period. This method is yet imperfect in that it ignores the effect of firm B. Firm 
B's pre-merger performance is often an indication of how well the firm will perform after 
the merger. The size of firm B may also alter the results. 




A+Ba + Db Post-Merger 
Transfer of Operations: Case3 
This method is useful in examining the post-merger effect from the perspective affirm 
B's shareholders. The pre-merger profitability ratio is that of firm B. This is compared 
to the aggregated values of firm A and B in the post-merger period. The flaw in this 
method is that it ignores the effect of firm A from the pre-merger period. The size of 
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firm A may also change the results indicated in this method. 
A + Bb Pre-Merger 
, D 
i 
A+Ba -t Bb Post-Merger 
Statistical Framework 
L The Ideal Model: Variables and Model Specification 
Economic Model 
ROApos" F a + ~ ROApre,; + 01 TYPE + ch DUPLEX + e 
ROApos(,F Median Annual Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets (EBITDA/Book Value of 
Assets) for post-merger years for company i 
ROA pre,; = Median Annual Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets (EBITDAIBook Value of 
Assets) for pre-merger years for company i 
The slope coefficient ~ captures the correlation in ROA between the pre- and post-merger 
years so that ~ ROApre,; measures the effect of the pre-merger performance on post-
merger returns. 
Two dummy variables are included to account for characteristics ofthe transactions. 
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TYPE = 1 if transaction was a business transfer transaction 
=0 otherwise (transaction was a merger transaction) 
DUPLEX =1 if firm has been involved in more than one merger transaction between 
1995 and 1999 
=0 otherwise (firm has merged only once between 1995 and 1999) 
The two dummy variables indicate whether the type of transaction; merger or business 
transfer and whether the firm undergoing a transaction more than once between the time 
period 1995-1999 has a significant effect on the post-merger performance. 
A positive value for the intercept term is expected from the economic theories and 
hypotheses described earlier. Positive values for ROApost,i and ROEpost,i are expected, 
indicating consistent profitability returns in the fifteen-year period examined. Given the 
fact that a merger transaction has a larger effect relative to a business transfer, or a partial 
M&A transaction, a positive coefficient is expected for TYPE. The coefficient for 
DUPLEX may be positive or negative, depending on how firms process transactions in a 
short period of time. Some firms may generate higher profits while others may incur 
loses in the short-run. 
II. Assumptions and Constraints 
Due to missing data, the ideal measures were approximated with the closest 
measure available. Below are descriptions of assumptions and constraints applied in 
noting substitutions in this paper. 
Market Value versus Book Value 
The book value; the value of an asset officially reported by the firm, usually 
differs from the asset' s current market value. This is because "accountants usually 
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measure assets by their original cost and then depreciate or 'write them down' over time 
according to rules that ignore market values (Bodie et al., 2002)." 
It is generally agreed that market value is a more relevant measure of financial 
decision making than book value. The book value of assets can differ from the market 
value of assets for two reasons. First, items reported on the balance sheet often do not 
include some economically significant assets. For example, a firm's reputation built up 
through the quality and reliability of the products, knowledge base as a result of training 
workers will not appear on the balance sheet. Second, there are other intangible assets 
(assets whose physical embodiment is irrelevant to their value) that are reported on the 
balance sheet through a process of estimating values such as the economic life of the 
asset. For example, when a firm purchases a patent, the value of that patent is recorded 
as an asset and amortized over time. Equipment purchased will be depreciated overtime 
through estimating the economic lifespan of the asset. 
In computing the profitability ratio for return on assets, the book value is used 
instead of the market value. The market value is a more precise measure for the reasons 
described above, but the inability to obtain the market value of assets will be 
compensated with the book value of assets. 
In measuring the effect of a merger transaction, the market value is unaffected by 
the method of accounting or the method of financing (Healy et aI., 1992). The method of 
accOlll1ting may be either the purchase method or the pooling method. The purchase 
method allows for the restatement of the target's firm assets at the current market value, 
where as the pooling method allows no such revaluation. The method of financing 
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differs if the transaction was fmanced by stock, cash, or a combination of cash, stock and 
other securities. 
EBITDA v .s. EBIT 
EBITDA refers to operating earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
amortization expenses are deducted. Due to missing values of EBIT (earnings before 
interest and tax deducted) for many firms in computing the ROA, EBITDA was 
substituted for EBIT. Since depreciation and amortization expenses are the allocation of 
an original cash amount spent for items such as equipment (Fraser et aI., 2004), long-term 
investments made by firms undergoing a merger transaction must be controlled for in this 
paper in order to account for the difference between EBITDA and EBIT. 
Industry-Adjusted Profitability Measurements 
The profitability ratios are adjusted to account for economy-wide effects and 
industry-wide characteristics. The industry-adjusted ROE or ROA is created by taking 
the difference between the ROE or ROA for individual firm "i, " and the industry mean. 
This is done for both post-merger ratios and pre-merger ratios. 
Debt-Equity 
In examining transactions by measuring firm equity, the dataset was revised to 
include only transactions that are comparable. "Shares of stock issued by two firms with 
identical assets but different debt/equity ratios are not really comparable (Bodie et al. 
204)." The debt-equity ratio was computed over a fifteen-year period for each firm in the 
dataset. A scatter plot shows these ratios for five years before and five years after the 
merger in Figure 6 (page 35). Ten firms along with their transaction counterparts were 
dropped from the dataset because their ratios were two standard deviations away from 
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their mean debt-equity ratio. The new scatter plot which displays the final observations 
of the debt-equity ratios, is in Figure 7 (page 36). 
III. Data and Methodology 
One of the difficulties in studying the early stages of the Japanese M&A boom is 
that the majority of transactions among Japanese firms are those involving private firms 
(Kamekawa et al" 1990), and thus their accounting information is not publicly available. 
Cross-border transactions; transactions involving foreign firms, are omitted from the 
sample since post-merger accounting data are difficult to obtain. 
Data collection was performed through Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank 
System (NEEDS), a financial statement database which contains over 30 years of 
historical data for balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow for all listed 
companies. The conversion from an unconsolidated to a consolidated accounting system 
in 2000 has caused difficulty in obtaining many of the variables of interest. For items 
whose method of reporting changed due to the change in the accounting system, figures 
were temporarily missing from the fmancial database. 
The unconsolidated accounting system is a single-firm accounting system, where 
firms report only the parent company's financial records regardless of the existence of 
subsidiary companies. Under the consolidated accounting system, firms are required to 
report financial figures for subsidiary companies as part of the parent company. There 
have been repeated incidences in the past of financial statement manipulation, some of 
which hid financial problems, which subsequently filed for bankruptcy of major Japanese 
firms. In most cases, firms had transferred large parent company losses to their 
subsidiary companies or their related companies to hide them. 
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International pressure to adopt the western accounting standards and domestic 
pressure to become more stringent on irregularities of accounting practice are two main 
causes of the change in the Japanese Accounting System (Nakata et al.). Refer to Table 2 
(page 42) for a timetable of changes in Japanese Accounting Rules. 
Analysis is based on 60 public merger transactions between 1995 and 1999. The 
sample period is the most recent period with sufficient pre- and post-merger accounting 
data available for the firms involved in the transactions. Given the fact that nearly 50% 
of mergers take place within the manufacturing industry every year (Table 3, page 43), 
analysis will focus solely on manufacturing firms. 
Table 4 (page 44) and Table 5 (page 45-47) are the lists of firms being examined 
in this paper. Transaction information including the date and type of transaction and 
names of firms were extracted from M&A Databook of Japanese Firms-1988~2002, 
published by Recof. The sample firms meet the following criteria. 
> The firms involved in the transaction are Japanese companies listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, Osaka Stock Exchange, or Nagoya Stock Exchange. 
> The company is categorized within the manufacturing industry under Nikkei 
Financial Codes. The company further positions itself into a sub-industry within 
the manufacturing industry (e.g., paper, fiber, construction, etc.). 
The pre-merger period and post-merger period are set as 1990-1994 and 2000-
2004 respectively. Profitability ratios are computed for these two time frames in order to 
assess the influence of the M&A transaction on profitability. 
Extracting appropriate financial data required the four-digit Nikkei Financial 
Codes. The codes were taken from the Japan Company Handbook, published quarterly 
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by Toyo Keizai Inc. Nikkei Codes for pre-merger companies that no longer exist or are 
no longer traded were taken from past issues of the handbook. Access to past issues of 
the Japan Company Handbook is limited to hardcopies stored in libraries with national 
scale large collections. The Nikkei Codes for this paper were collected at the National 
Diet Library in Nagata-chou, Japan. 
Summary of Results 
L Return on Assets 
Complete reports of the ROA and ROE regression results follow in Table 6 (page 48) 
through Table 9 (page 51). 
o indicates Standard Errors 
[] indicates White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
ROApost,i= -0.00440 + 0.625 ROApre,i -0.00290 TYPE -0.0121 DUPLEX + 8 
(0.00600) (0.0744) (0.00784) (0.00670) 
[0.00513] [0.130] [0.00720] [0.00620] 
II. ,Return on Equity 








Examining the scatter plot for the two regression results, it is possible that 
potential outliers are skewing the results (Figure 8, page 37 and Figure 9, page 38). Thus, 
influence statistics are computed. This is done by dropping each of the sixty observations 
in turn from the regression, and computing the change in the coefficient, divided by the 
standard error of the original regression that was estimated. The results are graphed in 
Figure 10 (page 39) and Figure 11 (page 40). 
Four observations in the ROA sample were deemed to be influential points based 
upon criteria of two standard deviations away from the mean value. One observation was 
excluded from the ROE sample based on the same method. 
IlL Return on Assets-Excluding Influential Points 
A complete report of the ROA and ROE regression results follow in Table 10 (page 52) 
and Table 11 (page 53). 
ROApos',;= -0.00123 + 0.583 ROApre,rO.00255 TYPE -0.0112 DUPLEX + E 
(0.00508) (0.0929) (0.00667) (0.00563) 
[0.00421] [0.132] [0.00637] [0.00591] 
• The merger effect, after controlling for the pre-merger return on post-merger 
performance, was statistically insignificant at the 10% level. 
• The coefficient on ROApre,i indicates that if firms have a positive pre-merger 
ROA, they have a positive pre-merger ROA. If they have a negative pre-merger 
ROA, they have a negative post-merger ROA. 
• The type of merger led a statistically insignificant effect on post-merger ROA. 
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• ~2 = 0.0112 indicates that the ROA for firms undergoing more than one merger 
transaction in five years is 1.1 % lower than those that only merged once. 
IV. Return on Equity-Excluding Influential Points 
ROEpost,i= 0.0105 + 0.735 ROEpre,i -0.0294 TYPE -0.0207 DUPLEX +g 
(0.00919) (0.106) (0.0111) (0.00956) 
[0.00680] [0.165] [0.00789] [0.00997] 
• There is a 1.1 % per-year increase in the post-merger return on equity after the pre-
merger performance is controlled for. This result is almost significant at the 10% 
level. 
• Given the results for ROA, the coefficient on ROEpre,liS as expected. Consistency in 
the coefficients for ROApre,l and ROEpre,l. show that firms with a positive cash flow 
return during the pre-merger period will have a positive cash flow return in the post-
merger period. Similarly, firms with a negative ROE in the pre-merger period have a 
tendency to carry over the negative effect in the post-merger period. 
• Post-merger ROE for firms that did a business transfer was 2.9% lower than firms 
that merged, so the type of merger is significant for ROE. 
• ~2 = -0.0207 indicates that ROE for firms undergoing more than one merger 
transaction in five years is 2. 1 % lower than those that only merged once. 
Analysis 
Results indicate that excluding influential points does not change the ROA results 
much. Results are improved for ROE after excluding one influential point. The effect of 
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pre-merger period ROE on post-merger period ROE is evidence of this since the 
significance of the coefficient changes from insignificant to significant within the 
regression. This shows that firms exhibit profitability returns overtime in a consistent 
manner. 
Conclusions from ROA are broadly consistent with that of ROE. Firm 
profitability persists overtime where firms carry over their positive or negative 
profitability measures to the post-merger period. 
Firms that have completed business transfer transactions perform worse relative to 
those that have undergone a merger transaction. A possible explanation can be attributed 
to the characteristics of the recent Japanese M&A market. If the majority offIrms 
completing M&A transactions are those that are performing poorly, aiming to recover 
from failed businesses due to the economic slump, a partial transaction may not be 
sufficient to improve a firm's profitability measure. A transaction where firms transfer 
their whole assets and liabilities along with their ownership may be necessary for firms 
that have severe profitability problems. Firms that are generally performing well may 
profit from completing business transfers as they treat the transaction as a business 
strategy. 
Firms that completed more than one transaction in the five-year period examined 
performed worse relative to those that only completed one transaction. This is due to the 
fact that the results are prevalent to the firm's short-term post-merger performance. With 
sufficient data in the future, one shall examine the long-term performance of the firms to 
confirm this result. Firms with several transactions within a short time period are less 
likely to perform well due to the challenges of moving assets and liabilities around and 
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creating the new structure of the organization. Generating profits within an entity 
generally follow after these procedures. 
The merger effect for ROA, despite the statistical insignificance, showed a slight 
disimprovement for firms that completed M&A transactions. However, the value of the 
negative improvement is negligible (0.12%). Results for the merger effect ROE was 
almost significant at the 10% level and showed a slight improvement in the post-merger 
period (1 %). 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined 60 manufacturing firms that have merged between 1995 
and 1999 in Japan. Firm profitability was assessed through two methods. 
The first assessment of the merger effect was through a ratio measuring the 
overall efficiency of the firm in managing its total investment in assets. No significant 
conclusion was reached pertaining to the "merger effect". The negative post-
performance of firms attributed to the merger effect was statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the small value of this negative merger effect was almost negligible. The 
effect of an M&A transaction in the post-merger period is on average neither better nor 
worse relative to the industry. 
The second assessment of the merger effect was through returns to investors. The 
merger effect showed a slight improvement in the short-term post-merger period after 
controlling for the effects of the pre-merger performance on the post-merger performance. 
This paper leaves room for further research in testing post-merger performances 
of different types in Japan. Different methods of measurement for business transfers 
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should be explored. In addition, a long-term perspective on the post-merger 
performances is another field that should be examined in the future. Although the model 
is significant according to the F -statistic, improvements may be made to the model by 
incorporating cultural characteristics that are distinct from the U.S. dataset, where the 
original model was based upon. 
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Appendix: Figures 
FIGURE 1: Total Number ofM&A Transactions in Japan 1995-1999 (Period 
Examined) 
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FIGURE 3: Nikkei Financial Newspaper Survey 1 
I s M&A A Necessity for Management? 
Survey by Nikkei Financial Newspaper 
1990. 1. 12 
[] Necessary 




~Necessary in the 
Future 
FIGURE 4: Nikkei Financial Newspaper Survey 2 
How Would You As a Manager Respond to a M&A 
Transaction Offer? 
OReject Under Any 
Condition 



















M&A involving an overseas company previously acquired by a Japanese company 
Foreign-capital acquirer - Japanese-capital target 
Japanese-capital acquirer - Foreign-capital target 
Japanese-capital acquirer - Japanese-capital target 
Source: Recof 
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Figure 6: Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
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Figure 7: Debt-to-Equity Ratio Excluding Outliers 
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Figure 9: Scatterplot for ROE 









0 .1 0 0 0 0:: 0 
0 
0 0 
0 o'l.o <9 
0 Q9. tfjo oil' 0 0 
<!'eCXSlOtJ~ 0 0 0 0 







-.20 -.15 -.10 -.05 .00 .05 .10 .15 
ROE POST 
38 




.1 .1 ._.1"_1 I. I .. '.', _,I II" I.,'. 0.0 
-0.4 
-0.8 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 













Sum Sq. Dev. 4.098892 
Observations 60 
39 







.-. --I ••• -1·.·--
-1~~~~~~~~Tn~nT~Tn~~~~Tn~ 
o I I .- - - - -
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 

















Table 1: Change in Legislation, Tax System, and Accounting System 
Dec. 
Legislation Ban of Holdings Company 1997 
Following Amendment of Anti·Monopoly Act, 
Prohibition of 100% Holdings Company 
Banned 
Oct. 
Simplification in M&A Procedure . 1998 
General Assembly Meeting for Transaction 
Scheme, Assembly Meeting for Post·Merger 
Establishment No Longer Required 
Simplification in Debtor Protection 
Proceedings 
Apr. 
Tax System Tax System for Corporate Restructuring 2001 
Establishment of Tax System for Corporate 
Restructuring 
Establishment of Tax Return for 
Consolidated System 
Accounting Mar. 
System Consolidated Accounting System 2000 
Conversion from Unconsolidated to 
Consolidated Accounting System 
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Table 2: Change in Accounting Rules 
Period Economy-wide Changes Changes to Accounting Rules 
1976 ./ Legislation of "Rule on Consolidated 
Financial Sheets" (This established 
consolidated accounting system) . 
1983 ./ Full enforcement of the Equity Model 
(This obliges firms to report equity 
investments to associated companies) . 
1989 Bubble Boom ./ New requirement to include 
consolidated financial sheets to firm's 
own individual financial sheets . 
1991 Bubble Burst ./ Publication of "Statement on the 
Reconsideration of the Consolidated 
Financial Sheets" 
2000 ./ Unconsolidated no longer used as a 
supplement to Consolidated. Full 
conversion to Consolidated Accounting 
System. 
Source: The Japan Institute of Labor 
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Table 3: Industry Breakdown 
I~~~ I~% 19r1 I~~~ 1m 










I PerreJtage I Percentage I PerOOllage I Percentage lPerren~ 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
2 0.4% 4 0,6% 2 03% I 0.1% J 03% 
and Fisheries 
Mining 2 0.4% I 02% J 0,4% I 0.1% 0,~10 
Constru~ion ~ 15% ~ 1.4% 16 2.1% II 13% IS 15% 
Food 26 4.~1o 26 4.2% 22 2.~1o 27 12% J8 JJ% 
Filler 7 13% 12 I.~% 1 0.~10 18 2,~1o 14 1.2% 
Paper, ~pe 4 0,8% 6 1.~10 4 05% 1 0,8% J 03% 
OIemical Products ~J 10,0% ~o 6,4% 4~ 6,~1o «l 4.8% 61 ),~Io 
MOOical Produ~s 9 1.1% 9 1.4% 19 2.m 16 1.~10 10 O,~% 
Coal, Pclroleum 1 0.2% 0,0% J 0,4% ~ 0.6% 1 0,6% 
Rubm 0.~10 1 l.l% 4 05% 2 0,~10 ) 0.4% 
Manufacturing f1i1lU1l1l1X. J 0,6% 1 1.1% IJ 1.1% 12 1,4% IJ 1.1% n..U· • 
Kiln Prooucts 8 15% 10 1.6% 12 1.6% W 1.~10 20 1.1% 
[on & Steel 2 0.4% 6 1.~10 ) 0,~10 11 13% 21 13% 
Nonferrous Metal I) 2,8% 21 14% 18 2,4% 14 1.~10 12 2.1% 
Machinery J~ 6,6% ]2 ),2% 22 2,~1o J) 4,~1o 61 ).2% 
Electronic Goods )4 10,~1o )4 8.1% 8) IIJ% 88 10,6% 108 ~,2% 
T rans~ortation 
28 )3% J4 )5% J6 4.~1o 4) ).4% 48 4.1% 
EQuipment 
Precision Jnstrurnen~ 14 2,6% 9 1.4% 11 15% II IJ% lJ l.l% 
Other Manufacturing 
12 23% 16 2,6% 12 1.0% II IJ% 10 Q,~/o 
Goods 
Su~Total 28] )1)% 10) 48.1% ]J9 4),0% J6~ 416% 491 425% 
Aggregated Sum (Including Glher m WQ,Q% 621 100,0% 1)) IOO,~1o 8J4 WO.~10 1169 lOO,~1o 
Industries) 
Source: Recof M&A Data book 
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Table 4: Merger Transactions 
# 
Mergers Between Public 
Companies Outside of their Post-Merger Firm Form 





North Kyushu Coca Cola 
Sanyou Coca Cola Bottling 









Ouji Paper (Shin Ouji Paper) 
Kamizaki Paper 















Touyou Japan Oxygen Merger 
7/27/1994 
Mitsui Petroleum Chemical 
7 Industrial Mitsui Chemical Merger 
9/911996 















Sumitomo Osaka Cement Merger 
311011994 
11 
Chichibu Onoda Cement 
Japan Cement 

















Calsonic Kansei Merger 
3/2411999 
44 
Table 5 Business Transfer Transactions 
# 
Mergers Between Public Companies Outside of 
Form 
Date of Transaction 
their Group Announcement 
Food 
1 
JT (Cigarette Industry) Business 1996/3115 
Morinaga Confectioner Transfer 
2 
JT (Cigarette Industry) Business 199911127 
Asahi Industrial Transfer 
Fiber 
3 




Asahi Industrial Business 1995/3/2 
Tokuyama Transfer 
5 
Mitsui Petroleum Industrial Business 1995/3/31 
Ube Kousan Transfer 
6 
Chisso Business 199517/12 
Tousou Transfer 
7 
Japan Oilpaper Business 1996/211 
Japan Carlit, Japan Kouki Transfer 
8 
Japan Park Rising Business 1996/3/29 
Chichibu Onoda (Pacific Cement) Transfer 
9 
Kamabuchi Chemical Industrial Business 1996112112 
Japan Paper Manufacturing Transfer 
10 
Fuji Picture Film Business 1997/3/6 
Dainihon Printing Transfer 
11 
Mitsui Touatsu Chemical Business 1997/6/2 
Sumitomo Chemical Industrial Transfer 
Asahi Industrial Business 1998/4/29 
12 
Mitsubishi Chemical Transfer 
13 
Shinetsu Chemical Industrial Business 1998/12/21 
Hitachi Production, Hitachi Tokyo Electronics Transfer 
14 
Sumitomo Chemical Industrial Business 1998/12/23 
Mitsui Chemical Transfer 
Asahi Industrial Business 1999/1/25 
15 
Japan Pigment: Thai Corporation Transfer 
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16 
Shouwa Denkou Business 19994/9 
Asahi Glass Transfer 
17 
Mitsubishi Chemical Business 1999/6/1 
Sumitomo Bay Client Transfer 
18 
Mitsubishi Chemical Business 1999/8/21 
Touwa Gousei Transfer 
19 
Mitsubishi Chemical Business 1999/9/1 
Kyouwa Ferment Industrial Transfer 
20 
Sekisui Kasei Industrial Business 1999/9/17 
Dainihon Ink Chemical Industrial (DIC) Transfer 
21 
. Dainihon Ink Chemical Industrial (DIC) Business 1999/12/8 
Shouwa High Polymer Transfer 
22 
Mitsui Chemical Business 1999/12/15 
Sumitomo Bay Client Transfer 
Coal, Petroleum 
23 
Shouwa Shell Petroleum Business 1997/2/15 
Mitsubishi Petroleum Transfer 
Rubber 
24 
Japan Synthesis Rubber (JSR) Business 1996/3/13 
Mitsubishi Chemical Transfer 
Printing, Publishing 
25 
Dainihon Printing Business 1999/6/3 
Hitachi Production Transfer 
Steel 
26 
Shin Nihon Iron Manufacturing Business 1998/9/29 
Tounen Transfer 
27 
Hitachi Metal, Sumitomo Metal Industrial Business 1998/10/30 
Tutsumi Metal Transfer 
28 
Shin Nihon Iron Manufacturing Business 1999/5/24 
Nisshin Steel Manufacturing Transfer 
29 
Sumitomo Metal Industrial Business 1999/7/30 
Mitsubishi Materials, Mitsubishi Material Silicon Transfer 
Sumitomo Metal Industrial Business 1999/9/20 
30 
Koube Steel Manufacture Transfer 






Iron Manufacturing Incorporated Business 1999/11124 
Tokyo Steel, Touyou Steel Manufacture Transfer 
NonFerrous Metal Products 
33 
Mitsubishi Materials Business 199917/28 
Ube Kousan Transfer 
34 
Hitachi Powder Metallurgy Business 199917/30 
Nissan Automobiles Transfer 
Electronics 
35 
Japan Chemicon Business 1997/3/6 
Mitsui Petroleum Industrial (Mitsui Transfer 
36 
Japan Computer Industrial Business 1998/5112 
Shibaura Production (Shibaura Mechatronics) Transfer 
37 
Oki Electronic Industrial Business 1998/1114 
Toushiba Transfer 
38 
Cannon Business 1998112/4 
NKK Transfer 
39 
Toushiba Business 199911/29 
Mitsubishi Electronics Transfer 
40 
Fujitsu Business 1999/4/5 
Hitachi Production Transfer 
41 
Okatani Electronic Industry Business 1999/4/22 
Fujitsu Transfer 
42 
Rome Business 1999/5/21 
Yamaha Transfer 
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NEC Business 199919/16 
Mitsubishi Electronics Transfer 
45 
NEC Business 1999/11/22 
Hitachi Production Transfer 
Precision Products 
46 
Fukuda Electron Business 1996111127 
Fuji Electronics Transfer 
47 
Riko Elemex Business 1999/11/18 
Kinseki Transfer 
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Table 6: Regression Report for ROA 
*=significant at the 10% level 
**=significant at the 5% level 
***=significant at the 1 % level 















Prob (F-statistics): 0.000000 
48 
Table 7: ROA Common Statistics 
ROA_POST ROA_PRE 
Mean -0.003257 0.015072 
Median 0.001925 0.010086 
Maximum 0.053550 0.145362 
Minimum -0.134881 -0.088834 
Std. Dev. 0.033447 0.038236 
Skewness -1.814049 0.404305 
Kurtosis 8.001140 6.294718 
larque-Bera 95.43625 28.77254 
Probability 0.000000 0.000001 
Sum -0.195394 0.904310 
Sum Sq. Dev. 0.066002 0.086258 
Observations 60 60 
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Table 8: Regression Report for ROE 
Variable Coefficient Significance 
Constant 0.035218 ** 
(0.012687) 
[0.014248] 
ROEl1re i 0.108955 
(0.107279) 
[0.317915] 
TYPE -0.027327 *** 
.(0.016377) 
[0.010124] 




F -statistic: 6.151592 
Prob (F-statistic): 0.001087 
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Table 9: ROE Common Statistics 
ROE_POST ROE_PRE 
Mean 0.002990 0.042882 
Median 0.011504 0.035916 
Maximum 0.102249 0.342483 
Minimum -0.179198 -0.055837 
Std. Dev. 0.050259 0.054330 
Skewness -1.570267 2.803744 
Kurtosis 6.393870 16.91735 
larque-Bera 53.45328 562.8413 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 
Sum 0.179425 2.572911 
Sum Sq. Dev. 0.149031 0.174155 
Observations 60 60 
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Table 10: Regression Report for ROA Excluding Influential Points 















Prob (F-statistics): 0.000000 
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Table 11: Regression Report for ROE Excluding Influential Points 




ROEnrei 0.734518 *** 
(0.106644) 
rO.164803] 
TYPE -0.029413 ' *** 
(0.011184) 
rO.0078851 





Prob (F-statistics): 0.000000 
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